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Economic  Effects  of U.S.  Dairy Programs
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Based on econometric analysis, this article estimates effects of terminating the
milk order system and milk price support, singly and together, over the period
1966-90.  Since  1980, milk orders have raised the national blend price by  1-
2%; price support has raised the blend price to well above the market clearing
price, by over 21% in 1  983. Short- and long-run benefits and costs are estimated
for various policy options under  1990 conditions.
Key  words:  benefits,  costs,  dairy programs,  milk orders,  milk price  effects,
price support.
Introduction
Many  would  argue,  particularly  with  the  advantage  of hindsight,  that  the dairy  price
support program was badly managed in the decade of the 1980s. Support prices were set
well above market-clearing levels; the consequences included large government  stocks of
surplus dairy products,  annual budget outlays that exceeded $2 billion in some years, and
production control programs that had never before been deemed necessary to reduce milk
output.
Quantifying the departures  from competitive performance  of the market for raw milk
caused by the price support program during the 1980s is the main objective  of this study.
Other aspects of national dairy  policy and other time periods also are considered.  More
particularly,  we consider  three policy options.  Under  Option I, price  discrimination  in
the pricing of fluid milk under federal orders and counterpart state programs is terminated
in a simulation analysis. Under Option II, the net government removals of dairy products
under the  milk price  support program,  together  with the supply management  programs
of the  1980s,  are  discontinued.  Analysis  of Option  III,  which  combines  the first  two
options,  generates  estimates of competitive  performance  subject  to the continuation  of
dairy import  quotas.'  The research  method employed involves the construction  and es-
timation  of an  11-equation  econometric  model  designed  for policy  analysis  estimated
using three-stage least squares (3SLS) and annual time series data for 1966-90. Our findings
lead to some significant modifications of recent research on the 1980s but tend to support,
with  some exceptions,  the conclusions  reached in the landmark  studies by the U.S. De-
partment  of Agriculture (USDA) and the American Agricultural  Economics  Association
(AAEA) Policy Task Force on Dairy Marketing Orders (AAEA Task Force) that summarize
and synthesize findings from  the earlier research,  particularly that completed  during the
1970s.
This article builds upon and adds to the findings of  recent papers on dairy policy. Dixon,
Susanto, and Berry studied the production effects  of the Milk Diversion Program (MDP)
and the Dairy Termination  Program (DTP) implemented in the 1980s,  concluding  that
both programs effectively reduced milk output, but in the short run only. Bausell, Belsley,
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and Smith concluded that during the latter half of the 1980s,  lowering the support price
would have been  effective,  relative  to the MDP and DTP, in reducing  the costs  to the
government and to consumers  and lowering income transfers to milk producers.  Unfor-
tunately, their quantitative  estimates of benefits and costs are open to serious  question.
The  model by  Bausell,  Belsley,  and  Smith  implicitly  assumes  an  aggregate  farm-level
commercial demand for milk (rather than the traditional blend price function that allows
for price  discrimination)  in which  the current quantity  of milk demanded is  expressed
implicitly as a function  of:  (a) lagged  quantity; (b) government  net removals,  measured
in milk  equivalent;  (c)  the government's  support  price;  (d) the Class I utilization  rate
under federal milk orders;  and (e) real disposal income per capita. Except for the income
variable, population  apparently is ignored.  In the Bausell,  Belsley, and Smith model, the
support program sets the market price rather than placing a floor on price. Unfortunately,
the market price,  sometimes below and oftentimes  well above the support price,  is not
included in the demand equation.  The market price likely will exceed  the support price
in the very case they presume to analyze, viz., the case where the support price is decreased
to relatively  low levels, to $6.87 per cwt in 1987.2
The analysis given below harks back to that by LaFrance and de Gorter, who quantified
the welfare  impacts  of policy options similar to those  noted  above for the years  1965
through  1980. We believe the present analysis both improves and updates the LaFrance-
de  Gorter work.  Importantly,  following  several  previous  researchers,  LaFrance  and  de
Gorter used the concept of milk equivalent (milk fat basis) to measure the net government
removals  of manufactured  dairy  products  in wholesale  markets.  This  procedure  risks
serious  bias in that it gives improper weight to the removals of nonfat dried milk and
cheese.  We estimate,  for example,  that the ratio  of pounds  of fat  removed  to  nonfat
removed equaled  .48 in 1983 and 14.7 in 1989. Instead of using milk equivalent measures,
we insert in the farm-level demand for "manufacturing"  milk two variables that measure
the levels  of fat and nonfat  solids embodied in government  net removals.  For this and
other reasons,  our results differ significantly from those of LaFrance and de Gorter.3
Model  Specification
An  economic model  designed  to explain the performance  of the farm-level  market  for
milk must take account of national dairy policy. This policy has three components.4 One
component is a price support program for milk purchased by manufacturers who use milk
in the production of specified nonfluid milk products:  cheddar cheese, butter, and nonfat
dry milk.  Briefly, when  necessary,  the federal government  removes  these manufactured
products from wholesale markets to elevate milk product prices. The assumption  is that
competition among processors, many of whom are farmer-owned cooperatives, will ensure
that product  price increases  will increase prices to producers.  The  idea is to strengthen
farm-level  demand in those periods when farm prices would otherwise fall below support
levels. The surpluses are stored and made available to commercial buyers at  110% of the
government's  purchase price.  If prices  fail to improve,  surpluses are donated to various
domestic  and foreign feeding programs.  For much of the post-World War II period, the
objective was to keep prices from  falling below specified levels of parity, but the role of
parity has greatly  diminished since  1982.
A second component of dairy policy consists of a system of federal  milk orders that,
together with counterpart state programs, set minimum purchase prices for Grade A (fluid
grade)  milk  according  to  use  classification.  Milk  used  for fluid  (beverage)  purposes  is
assigned to Class I, the highest value-use class.5 Under federal milk orders,  Class I prices
are  set equal to the two-month lagged  Minnesota-Wisconsin  price, the price paid by a
sample of 166  Minnesota-Wisconsin  milk manufacturing  plants,  plus Class I price  dif-
ferentials that are, for markets east of  the Rocky Mountains, positively related to distances
from Eau Claire, Wisconsin.  For example, in 1990,  the average  Class I price  differential
for all federal milk orders was $2.65 per cwt, with the Minnesota-Wisconsin price equaling
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Table  1.  List of Variables  and Definitions
Variable Definition
Endogenous  Variables:
BLP  =  Average  price  of milk  received  by producers  (dollars per
cwt).
CIM  =  Number of milk cows (thousands).
FM* =  Total  milk  sales  to  processors  for  fluid  milk  production
(millions of pounds).
FMP = FM per capita  (pounds).
MFPR  =  Ratio of the milk price to the price of dairy feed, 16% protein
(pound-per-pound  basis).
MM  = Total milk sales to processors for the manufacturing of non-
fluid milk products (millions of pounds).
MMP  = MM per capita (pounds).
PFM =  Class  I  price  established by federal  milk orders for  3.5%
butterfat content,  all market average (dollars per cwt).
PMM =  Price of milk allocated  to manufactured  products  as mea-
sured by the Minnesota-Wisconsin  price  (dollars per cwt).
QMS  = Total milk production minus milk used on farms (millions
of pounds).
YLD  = Milk production per cow (thousands  of pounds).
Exogenous  and Predetermined Variables:
AHE  =  Average  hourly earnings in the private sector excluding ag-
riculture (dollars per hour).
CPI =  Consumer price index for all items (average for 1982-84  =
100).
DTP =  Dummy variable equaling one for years 1986-90  and zero
otherwise (Dairy Termination Program).
FGP =  Net government  purchases of fat solids,  per capita.
IMFP =  Index of prices for meat,  fish, and poultry (1967  =  100).
L1CIM =  Number of cows milked (CIM) lagged one year (thousands).
L2CIM =  Number of  cows milked (CIM) lagged two years (thousands).
MDP =  Dummy  variable  equaling one  for years  1984  and  1985,
and zero otherwise  (Milk Diversion Program).
MMFPR =  Four-year  moving  average  of the  milk-feed  price  ratio
(MFPR), excluding  the current year.
NGP  =  Net government purchases of nonfat milk solids, per capita.
TREND  =  Trend with  1966 set equal to one.
Note: A detailed statement of the data, data sources,  and estimation pro-
cedures used in preparing the data set has been written by Greg Mode and
can be obtained by writing to the senior author.
* FM  equals total fluid milk consumption plus corrections for the pounds
of fat solids removed from raw milk and the pounds of  nonfat solids added.
$12.21.  The Class  I price differentials  in the Chicago and New York/New Jersey orders
were, respectively, $1.50 and $3.22. In many parts of the country, moreover, milk producer
cooperatives  bargain  with processors  and secure  over-order  premiums  for milk used in
fluid distribution.
The third component of national dairy policy is a set of strict import  quotas on man-
ufactured dairy products  that are  equivalent to or compete with the products  acquired
under the price support program. These quotas, justified on the basis of the need to protect
the domestic  price  support program  under  Section  22  (Agricultural  Adjustment  Act of
1933), severely limit imports. We estimate that in 1990, for example, the fat solids (nonfat
solids)  embodied  in imported dairy products  accounted roughly  for 2.1%  (.9%) of U.S.
production.
As noted, our analysis is based on an  11-equation  model of the farm-level market for
milk estimated  using annual  time series  for  1966-90  and  3SLS.  Several  equations  are
definitional.6 The variables are defined in detail in table  1.
The average (blend) milk price function  is given by:
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PFM.  FM + PMM.  MM
(1)  BLP=  FM + PMMblend  price,
QMS
where BLP is the national average annual price of milk received by producers; FM is the
total  milk sold to processors  for fluid milk (beverage)  production, with PFM  being the
corresponding  price per cwt; MM is the total milk sold to manufacturers for production
of nonfluid products, with PMM  being the corresponding price per cwt; and QMS is total
farm sales of milk. (The Minnesota-Wisconsin  milk price is used as the best measure of
PMM.) All of the variables  in this equation are endogenous.  Total milk sales (excludes
milk consumed on the farm) equals the sum of fluid and manufacturing milk. Importantly,
equation (1) is not a demand equation as in the formulation proposed by Bausell, Belsley,
and  Smith. The  blend price  reflects  the widespread  existence of discrimination  in the
pricing of milk through both federal  milk orders  and state milk control programs.
The processor  demand for fluid milk is given by:
(2)  FMP = D1(PFM, CPI, AHE, TREND)  demand  for fluid use,
where FMP  is fluid milk (FM) per capita, CPI  is the consumer price index, AHE is average
hourly  earnings in the private  sector, and TREND is trend with  1966  set equal  to  one.
Average hourly earnings was used instead of per capita income because national income
has become increasingly concentrated  among the well-to-do  in recent years.
The processor demand for manufacturing milk is given by:
(3)  MMP = D2(PMM, IMFP, FGP, NGP, TREND)
demand for manufacturing  use,
where MMP is  manufacturing  milk (MM) per  capita;  IMFP is the index  of prices  for
meat, fish, and poultry; and FGP  and NGP are the net government removals of fat solids
and nonfat solids, respectively,  both on a per capita basis.
The  inclusion  of FGP and  NGP is  necessitated  by  the  government's  price  support
program  for manufacturing  milk  and  other food  programs  such  as school  lunch.  It is
mainly in this respect that our model differs from previous models. In most of the sample
years,  the government  acquired and removed  from wholesale  channels  of trade butter,
nonfat dried milk, and, on  several occasions,  cheese,  mainly to increase the farm-level
demand  for  manufacturing  milk.  Modest  net  quantities  of dairy products  have  been
acquired by the government  for food programs for the needy even in those years when
market prices exceeded  support levels,  e.g., in  1973-76.  Importantly,  the price  support
program does not displace a pricing  system at the farm  level based on private demand
and supply. The government  does not stand willing to purchase raw milk at the support
level.
The quantity of milk produced annually  is expressed as the product of the number  of
cows milked (CIM) and milk production per cow (YLD).  The supply for cows milked is:
(4)  CIM = S,(MMFPR, DTP, MDP, LI CIM, L2CIM)  herd size,
where MMFPR is a four-year moving  average of the ratio of price of milk (BLP) to the
price  of dairy  feed.  This moving average excludes the current  year and is  inserted as  a
proxy for the expected returns to investment in dairy cows.  The size of the dairy herd is
taken as a simple but accurate measure of the size of the milk production industry's fixed
plant. To  take account  of the Milk  Diversion Program,  a dummy  variable  (MDP) was
included, which equals one for the years  1984  and 1985,  and zero otherwise.  Under this
program,  milk producers  were  paid to reduce production. To take  account of the Dairy
Termination Program,  a dummy variable (DTP) was included, which equals zero for the
years  1966-85  and  one  for  1986-90.  Under this  program,  dairy farmers  were  paid to
liquidate  their herds and  to refrain  from  producing  milk for  five  years.  Following the
suggestion  of Chavas  and  Klemme,  cows  milked  lagged  one  year  (L1CIM) and  cows
milked  lagged  two  years  (L2CIM) were  included  to take  account  of the dynamics  of
changing  herd size.  Experimentation  with various combinations of lagged variables  led
to the choice of L1 CIM and L2CIM as the best predictors.
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Table 2.  Structural Parameters of a Model of the U.S. Farm-Level
Market for Milk, Estimated Using Three-Stage  Least Squares and
Time Series for 1966-90
Parameter  Asymptotic
Variate  Estimate  t-Ratio
Per Capita Demand for Milk Used  in Fluid Milk Production (FMP):
CON1*  +287.5394  75.94
PFM  1.6439  3.58
CPI  -. 2173  .75
AHE  -8.8820  1.58
TREND  +.6621  1.04
R
2 = .982
Per Capita Demand for Milk Used  in Manufactured Dairy Products (MMP):
CON2  +229.2198  19.73
PMM  -12.2585  5.49
FGP  +10.5855  1.86
NGP  +8.3578  3.25
IMFP  +.8997  4.77
TREND  -1.7902  1.07
R
2 =  .910
Number of Cows  Milked (CIM):
CON3  -1,226.5896  1.38
MMFPR  +888.2464  2.19
DTP  -284.1255  3.46
MDP  -168.3872  1.60
L1CIM  +.4613  3.12
L2CIM  +.3070  2.44
R
2 = .975
Milk Production per Cow (YLD):
CON4  +6.9405  11.48
MFPR  +.6227  1.45
TREND  +.2498  37.30
R
2 = .984
Note: R2 is the coefficient  of multiple correlation.
* CONi is the constant term (i = 1 ... ,  4).
The milk production per cow (YLD)  equation is:
(5)  YLD = Sy(MFPR, MDP, TREND)  milk yield per cow,
where MFPR is the current milk-feed price ratio. The dummy variable MDP  was included
to take account of the Milk Diversion Program. Trend was included to capture the effect
of technological progress.
The price of milk for fluid use (PFM) was set equal to the Minnesota-Wisconsin  price
(PMM), an endogenous variable,  plus the average  Class I price differential for all federal
milk  orders  (C1DIF), the  latter taken  as exogenously  determined  by the government.
Over-order premiums negotiated by milk producer cooperatives are hypothesized to equal,
approximately,  the  price  for services  provided by cooperatives,  services that lower the
procurement  costs of buyers (see Babb and Bessler).
Additional equations were required to define per capita demand quantities for fluid and
manufacturing  milk.  One equation was required to define the milk-feed price ratio.
Econometric  Results and Validation
The estimated  structural parameters  of the econometric  model are given in table 2.  All
estimated own-price coefficients have the correct sign and, with the exception of the milk
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yield  equation,  the  asymptotic  t-ratios  are  in excess  of 2.0.  The  demand  elasticities,
estimated  for mean  values,  equal  -. 076  and  -. 350 for fluid  milk and manufacturing
milk, respectively.  The elasticity  of short-run  supply (holding dairy herd size constant)
equals +.081.  The steady-state or long-run elasticity that allows for changes in both feeding
rates and herd size equals + .583. These elasticity estimates are plausible in light of previous
research  (AAEA Task  Force).  The per capita  consumption  of fluid milk has long been
held to be unresponsive  to changes in price. The  same is  true for milk production  per
cow, which has trended upward as a result of better herd management, more productive
cows, and other technological advances. In response to sharp price decreases, for example,
farmers  likely cut back on feeding  rates to a limited extent.  In addition, many farmers
give up leisure in order to increase production and maintain income. Milking cows three
times  a day  instead  of only  twice  is  an example  of how this  can be  accomplished.  In
keeping with other research, we find that production per cow tends to be rather insensitive
to the prices of milk and feed.
Regarding the  effects  of exogenous  shocks, we note that, as expected, government  re-
movals of fat and nonfat solids from wholesale markets increase significantly the demand
for manufacturing milk at the farm  level. The Milk Diversion Program, and particularly
the Dairy Termination Program,  decreased herd size, again as expected. It may be noted
that experimentation  with  the price of margarine, per capita incomes,  price of nonmilk
beverages, and demographic variables (percentage of population under age 18, for example)
as potential shifters of milk demands led to unsatisfactory  signs or levels of significance
of estimated  coefficients.
As a means of validation, the entire equation model was used in a dynamic simulation
of market performance  over the period  1966-90.  All exogenous variables were  assigned
their actual values year after year. Herd sizes were simulated. Simulated and actual values
for all  endogenous  variables  then  were  compared.  For  example,  both  the  actual  and
simulated average or blend prices to farmers over the sample period are shown in figure
1. Though simple, the model does a good job of tracking price history. The mean absolute
percentage  (MAP) error for the blend price (BLP) equaled  5.7%. The MAP errors for the
other variables  are shown below.7
Variable  MAP Error
Total milk sales (QMS)  1.6
Milk used in fluid production per capita (FMP)  .7
Milk used in manufacturing  per capita (MMP)  2.4
Price of fluid milk (PFM)  5.5
Price of manufacturing milk (PMM)  7.4
Number of milk cows (CIM)  1.5
Milk production per cow (YLD)  1.5
The model tracks the histories of quantity variables more closely than of price variables,
largely, one suspects,  because demand and supply functions tend to be inelastic. Overall,
in light of the signs and asymptotic t-ratios of estimated coefficients and the model's ability
to track history,  we  believe the econometric  model provides a plausible  quantified  ex-
planation of the performance  of the U.S. farm-level  market for milk. The implications
of the model with regard to the effects of changes  in national dairy policy  are therefore
of interest.
Terminating Dairy Programs
Three policy options that diminish government intervention in milk pricing  are consid-
ered. Under  Option I,  price discrimination  under federal  milk orders  and state  control
programs is terminated, but the price  support program is maintained. The  Class I price
differential is set equal to zero. Under a variant of this option, the price differential is set
at  50¢  per cwt.8 It is  assumed that any  price  premiums  received by milk producer  co-
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Figure 1.  Actual and simulated  blend prices (BLP)  for milk
operatives  would  cover  exactly  the  cost of services  provided  to milk handlers.  Under
Option II, net governmental withdrawals of manufactured  dairy products (butter, cheese,
and nonfat dried milk) are eliminated, but federal milk orders are maintained.  The two
variables, FGP  and NGP, appearing in equation (3) are set equal to zero. The two dummy
variables,  DTP and MDP, appearing on the supply side in equations (4) and (5) also are
set equal  to zero for the entire  sample  period,  thus eliminating the Dairy Termination
and Milk Diversion Programs. Option III eliminates both federal  milk orders and price
support,  yielding estimates  of the "competitive"  outcome.  As noted,  the relaxation  of
dairy import quotas is not analyzed  in this study.
Using  the model  set forth  above,  the performance  of the market  for raw  milk was
simulated  dynamically  over the sample  period  with and without  dairy programs.  The
percentage changes  in the blend price (BLP), fluid milk price (PFM), and manufacturing
milk price (PMM) under Option I are shown in figure 2. Setting the Class I price differential
equal to  zero  (50¢  per cwt)  caused  the  simulated national  blend price  to fall by  5.7%
(4.3%) on average over the five-year  period  1966-70. For the rest of the sample period,
the annual  declines were less than  1.8%  (1.4%  for the 50¢ differential),  with no apparent
trend. The relatively large decline in the early five-year period partly reflects initial excess
capacity due to preexisting price discrimination.
The modest declines in the blend price caused by setting the Class I price differential
equal  to zero  mask  the dramatic  effects  on  fluid  and  manufacturing  milk prices.  The
percentage  declines  in fluid milk prices trended downward,  from 27.2% in  1966 (19.5%
with the  50¢ differential) to 9% in 1982 (6.8%), and then rose to 12% by 1990 (9.8%). In
contrast,  over the  period  1966-90,  the  manufacturing  milk price  increased. 9 The  per-
centage increases trended downward, from 17.2% in 1966 (12.2% with the 50¢ differential)
to 5.2% in  1982 (3.9%),  and then rose slightly to 5.9% in  1990 (4.7%).
Figure  3 is a graphic presentation  of the estimated blend price  history with programs
in effect,  the base simulation,  and the estimated price history without the price  support
program (Option II). (Milk orders are maintained.)  Importantly, the period  1961-65 was
one  of considerable  government  intervention  with  relatively  large net  withdrawals  of
manufactured  dairy  products.  By  1965,  market  performance  had  veered  substantially
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Figure  2.  Percentage  changes  in  blend price (BLP),  fluid  milk price  (PFM),  and manufacturing
milk price (PMM)  under Option I
away from  competitive performance.  In  figure  3,  the  effects  of two  alternative  ways  of
eliminating surplus capacity are presented.  Simply terminating the price support program
would have reduced  the milk price  on average  by 13.2%  over the period  1966-72. The
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Figure 4.  Simulated  manufacturing milk prices  (PMM)  with and without dairy programs
1972. Actual price support policy consisted of reducing government withdrawals of nonfat
milk solids, beginning in 1967,  and holding fat  solid withdrawals roughly constant until
market conditions improved.  With programs,  the estimated size of the dairy herd fell by
16% of its  1966 value to  12 million cows in 1992. Over the period  1966-73, blend prices
rose more  slowly with price support than without.
The period  1979-83  was not unlike that of 1960-65  in that government  policy  again
involved relatively  high  price  supports  and  greatly  increased  net withdrawals  of dairy
products. Again, market performance veered sharply away from the competitive outcome.
The withdrawals of milk fat and milk nonfat solids increased in 1979  from 81.7 million
pounds  and  261.8  million  pounds, respectively,  in  1979  to  610.2  million pounds  and
1,286  million  pounds,  respectively,  in  1983.  The  percentage  increases  in the national
blend price as  a result of the support program rose from  2% in 1979  to 21.6% in  1983.
The size of the nation's dairy herd, which had declined continuously over the period 1966
through 1980 with programs in effect, suddenly began to increase. Thus, toward the mid-
1980s, the dairy industry was burdened with excess capacity,  much as it was in the mid-
1960s.  Government withdrawals,  especially of nonfat  solids, were  decreased  starting in
1985.  In addition, the Dairy Termination and Milk Diversion Programs represented new
weapons  created  to  do  battle with the  excess  capacity  that the government  itself had
created through  its management (one is tempted to say "mismanagement")  of the price
support  program.  Even so, by  1990, the blend price  with programs  was still more than
10%  above the Option II price.
We estimate that the Option II regime would have kept the blend price at around $11.20
per cwt over  1979-84, in stark contrast to the price  support program,  with prices falling
to  $10.54  in  1985  and  $10.80  in  1986.  The  milk-feed  price  ratio,  on the  other hand,
would have plummeted from  1.41 in 1979 to 1.16 in 1984. The nation's dairy herd would
have fallen by 2.2%  over this same  period.  Relative  to the price  support  program, the
blend price would have risen briskly after 1984  to $12.52 in  1990. The milk-feed price
ratio  would have recovered  to previous  levels and  the nation's  dairy herd would have
increased.
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dynamically over the period  1966-90 with and without dairy programs (Option III). This
price is of particular interest to Minnesota  and Wisconsin producers who rely heavily on
the manufacturing  market as an outlet for their milk. To these producers,  national dairy
policy has been something of a mixed  blessing.  The price support program,  if properly
managed, can be used to elevate the farm-level demand for manufacturing  milk,  at least
in the short run. Federal  milk orders,  on the other hand, tend to decrease the proportion
of milk output going to fluid consumption while  at the same time expanding production
in those  areas with  large  population  centers,  particularly  in the northeastern  states.  As
can be seen in figure 4, producers who relied heavily on the manufacturing milk market
would have  enjoyed higher prices in the years  1970-76 and  1978-79  had there been no
programs at all.
Figure 4 also raises a question with regard to the position often advanced in the literature
on farm  policy that  programs are needed to stabilize  markets.  This view overlooks the
possibility  of government  mismanagement  of commodity programs.  The coefficient  of
variation of the simulated manufacturing  milk price (blend price) with and without dairy
programs over the period  1966-90 equaled, respectively, 38.9% (35.1%) and 33.8%. (The
blend price equals the manufacturing  price  under Option III.)
We next turn to policy simulations used to assess the short-run  and long-run effects of
terminating dairy programs under 1990 conditions. In 1990, government net withdrawals
of fat solids equaled  6.1% of U.S. production.  The corresponding  figure for nonfat solids
was 1.1%. The analysis that follows is useful in assessing the welfare effects of government
intervention on a modest but sustained basis as might happen if  the Dairy Export Incentive
Program continues to grow as it has in recent years (see Dobson and Knapp). By definition,
effects  are short run if the number of dairy cows is held fixed.  Long-run effects  allow for
changes  in the size of the dairy herd in response to changes in the milk-feed price ratio.
The  three policy  options  described  above  are  again considered.  The  estimated market
performance effects  are given in table 3.
To understand how these estimates  were obtained,  consider Option I, which involves
setting the Class I price differential equal to zero. Initially,  exogenous variables, including
program  variables,  are set equal  to their  1990 values.  The  "expected"  milk-feed  price
ratio (MMFPR) is set equal to the average price ratio for the four years  1986-89. Market
performance  was  estimated on  the basis of the  11-equation  model set forth above  for
1990, holding number of cows constant,  and in the long run (steady state),  allowing the
milk-feed  price  ratio and  herd size to reach their equilibrium  levels.  Because the DTP
was  a five-year program,  the dummy  variable DTP was set equal  to one  for  1990, but
zero thereafter.  (Steady state was reached  in eight years.) The entire procedure was then
repeated,  except the Class  I price  differential was  set equal  to zero.  The changes  in the
endogenous variables caused by this policy change  are given in table 3 for both the short
and long run.  Percentage  changes  (given in  parentheses)  are  estimated using the with-
government-program  values as bases. Similar procedures were used to analyze the effects
of Options II and III.
The estimated  effects given in table  3 are in line with the results of previous research,
with  some  exceptions.  Summarizing  the work  prior  to  1986,  the  AAEA  Task  Force
concludes that milk orders have elevated the national blend price by 2-5%. Our estimated
short-run effect under Option I (4.2%) falls within this range, whereas our long-run effect
(1.8%) suggests that the lower part of the range may be closer to the truth. Ippolito  and
Masson (for  1973) and Dahlgran (for 1976)  estimate  that eliminating milk orders would
in the long run lower fluid milk price by about 8 to 9%, less than both our short-run effect
(14.2%) and our long-run effect (13.3%). For manufacturing milk, the estimates of Ippolito
and Masson (p. 54) and Dahlgran for Option I are a positive 5.6% and  11%, respectively.
Both are considerably  larger than our estimated short-run effect (+3.1%),  but closer to
our long-run effect (+6.4%).  (As a percentage of the national blend price, the Class I price
differential  equaled  29.8% in 1973, 21.7% in  1976,  and  19.3%  in 1990.)
The  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  concluded  in  1984  that eliminating  the  price
support program would, in the short run, lower the blend price by 15-20%, quite in line
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Table 3.  Estimated Short-Run and Long-Run Market Performance Effects  of Changes in National
Dairy Policy under 1990 Conditions
Changes/(%  Changes) in Endogenous  Variables
Manufac-
Fluid  turing  Manufac-
Total Milk  Blend  Milk Use  Fluid  Milk Use  turing
Output  Price  Per Capita  Milk Price  Per Capita  Milk Price
Policy Changes  (QMS)  (BLP)  (FMP)  (PFM)  (MMP)  (PMM)
Short-Run Options:
I.  Discontinue  milk orders  -327  -. 6  +3.69  -2.24  -4.99  +.51
(-4.2)  (+1.7)  (-14.2)  (-1.4)  (+3.1)  (+3.9)
II.  Discontinue  milk price  +2,630  -2.39  +3.42  -2.08  +7.1  -2.08
support  (+1.8)  (-14.67)  (+1.6)  (-13.1)  (+2.0)  (-15.8)
III.  Competitive  markets  +2,225  -2.65  +7.1  -4.3  +1.8  -1.65
(+1.6)  (-18.7)  (+3.3)  (-27.1)  (+.5)  (-12.5)
Long-Run  Options:
I.  Discontinue  milk orders  -1,517  -.23  +3.16  -1.9  -9.19  +.75
(-1.0)  (1.8)  (+1.4)  (-13.3)  (-2.5)  (+6.4)
II.  Discontinue  milk price  -2,959  -. 45  +.82  -.47  -12.56  -.47
support  (-2.0)  (-3.6)  (+.4)  (-3.3)  (-3.4)  (-4.0)
III.  Competitive  markets  -4,522  -.69  +3.9  -2.36  -21.97  +.29
(-3.0)  (-5.4)  (+1.8)  (-16.5)  (-5.9)  (+2.5)
Notes: Dairy import quotas are maintained under all options. Dropping milk orders means that the Class I price
differential was set equal to zero.  Dropping the milk price  support program means  that government removals
of both fat and nonfat milk solids were set equal to zero. Competitive markets mean that milk orders and price
supports both were dropped. Long-run values are steady-state values after seven years. Percentage changes given
in parentheses  were calculated using simulated values under  1990 conditions, including milk orders and price
supports, as base values.
with our short-run estimate of 14.7% when allowance is made for the limited withdrawals
of dairy products  in  1990  relative  to those  in the early  1980s.  Our estimated  long-run
effect (-3.6%) reflects the substantial moderating effect of a downward adjustment of cow
numbers in response  to a price  decline.
As a final comment regarding table 3, we estimate that elimination of both milk orders
and price support (Option III) lowers the national blend price by 18.7% in the short run
and  5.4% in the long run.  The  2.5% long-run  increase  in the manufacturing  milk price
again reflects the remarkable tilt of national dairy policy in favor of the producers of milk
for fluid consumption.
Estimates  of both  the short-run  and  long-run  welfare  impacts  of dairy  program  ter-
mination are given in table 4.10 Fluid milk buyers would be the big gainers from program
termination (Option III), with benefits equaling $2,375 million in the short run and $1,276
million in the  long run.  Expressed as percentages  of fluid milk expenditures at the farm
level in 1990, these gains amount to 37% in the short run and  19%  in the long run.
Manufacturing milk buyers lose from terminating milk orders, but gain from terminating
price supports. The net effect is a small loss in the long run, equaling $265 million. This
amounts to 3%  of manufacturing  milk expenditures.
The loss of producer surplus equals $3,958 million in the short run and $1,171 million
in the long run.  Expressed as percentages  of total farm receipts,  these losses amount to
24% in the short run and 7% in the long run. The short-run loss per cow equals $273.15,
which means a farmer with a 40-cow herd would lose $10,926  per year. Long-run profits
equal  zero,  in the absence  of barriers to  entry,  and the long-run  decrease in  producer
surplus must be interpreted as a loss to suppliers of inputs to the dairy industry, particularly
to land owners.
A rough estimate of the short-run  efficiency  gain (increase  in net benefits) associated
with dairy program termination (Option III) can be obtained by subtracting from the sum
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Table 4.  Estimated Short-Run and Long-Run  Welfare Effects  of Changes in National Dairy Policy
under 1990 Conditions ($ millions)
Change in  Change in
Fluid Milk  Manufacturing  Change in
Consumer  Milk Consumer  Producer
Policy Changes  Surplus  Surplus  Surplus
Short-Run Options:
I.  Discontinue  milk orders  + 1,205.8  -353.8  -859.5
II.  Discontinue  milk price support  + 1,207.4  +1,880.0  -3,067.7
III.  Competitive  markets  +2,375.0  +1,518.0  -3,957.5
Long-Run  Options:
I.  Discontinue  milk orders  +1,052.0  -648.0  -443.8
II.  Discontinue  milk price support  +220.3  +449.1  -763.03
III.  Competitive markets  + 1,275.5  -264.5  - 1,171.4
Note: Welfare effects  are measured  by changes in consumer and producer  surpluses in short-run and long-run
equilibria.
of the gains to consumers and taxpayers the loss to milk producers.  Since net government
expenditure  on the  1990 price  support program amounted  to roughly  $608 million,  the
short-run efficiency gain under Option III amounts to about $543 million. This estimate
does not take into account the costs and benefits to people living abroad and to the needy.
Reflections  on National Dairy Policy
The  experience  gained under dairy  programs,  particularly  during  the  1980s,  calls into
question the need for such programs. The argument that milk orders are needed to forestall
market failure  in fluid milk distribution is consistent with neither theory nor available
evidence  (see,  for example,  Helmberger,  pp.  162-64.)  Milk  orders  must be  viewed  as
income redistribution devices that have elevated the national blend price between  1 and
2% since  1980. Fluid milk price increases, caused by price discrimination, rose from about
7-10% in 1980 to about 10-12% in 1990. Manufacturing milk price decreases  amounted
to about 4-6% over this period, with no apparent trend. (The limits of  the interval estimates
depend on whether the Class I price differential is set at zero or 50¢ per cwt.) Why should
fluid milk consumers and Minnesota-Wisconsin  milk producers, who rely heavily on the
market  for manufacturing  milk,  get  "socked"  for  the  benefits  to  manufactured  dairy
product  consumers  and  to those milk producers  who  happen  to live  close  to big  cities
distant from Eau Claire?
Whether  the  milk price  support  program  makes any  sense  depends  on  whether  the
United States wants  to play the European  Community's game-i.e.,  subsidize milk pro-
duction heavily through  price support  and dump the surplus into  foreign  markets.  The
recent experience with the Dairy Export Incentive  Program points in that direction,  and
the above  analysis of dairy programs  for 1990  provides ballpark estimates of the likely
short-run  and  long-run  domestic  effects  of dumping  about  6.1%  (1.1%) of the nation's
milk fat (nonfat) production into foreign markets.
In the absence of dumping into world  markets,  the outlets for  surplus dairy  products
removed from wholesale markets are very limited. Support prices set in excess of market-
clearing  levels  cause  problems.  The  larger the  disparity,  the bigger  the problems.  The
decade  of the  1980s provides ample evidence  of what can go wrong.  According to  our
estimates, the price support program elevated the price of milk above the market clearing
level by 14% in 1980, 19% in 1981, 20% in 1982, and 22% in 1983. Without price support,
the number of milk cows would have continued to fall, as it had since  1966. Under price
supports, the nation's dairy herd increased by  1% over the four-year period  1980-83.
Broadly speaking,  the government created  milk production capacity in the early  1980s
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that  wasn't needed until the early  1990s.  It then had to scramble  to undo the damage.
Downsizing the fixed plant of the dairy industry involves painful adjustments on the part
of producers, which likely explains why the government  first paid farmers not to use all
their production capacity  (milk diversion) and then to  scale  back capacity  (dairy herd
termination)."  The experience of the  1980s was similar in several respects to that of the
1960s.
[Received January  1994; final revision received August 1994.]
Notes
1 Import quotas  may not be continued under current  law in the absence of a price support program, but, as
has happened  in the past,  support levels could be  set well below competitive  market-clearing  levels, which is
functionally  equivalent to terminating the support program.
2 The actual  support price  for  1 January through  20  September  1987  equaled $11.35  at the average milkfat
test. We estimate that in the absence of price support and supply management programs over the period 1966-
90,  the  market price  would have  equaled  $11.38  per  cwt  in  1987  (see fig.  3),  well  above the  support  price
proposed  by Bausell,  Belsley,  and  Smith.  Also,  estimating  U.S.  milk  production  for  prices  as  low as  those
envisaged  in the Bausell,  Belsley,  and Smith  paper is problematic because  such  prices  are  far removed  from
historical experience.
3 LaFrance  and de Gorter found that over the four-year period  1969-72, when the government was removing
substantial quantities  of fat and nonfat solids, the blend price with programs exceeded on average the simulated
competitive  price  by  10.5¢  per  cwt.  Over  the  four-year  period  1973-76,  when  government  removals  were
relatively  small and  with the market price  often  exceeding the  support  price,  the blend price  with programs
exceeded the simulated competitive price by 26.7¢ on average. These findings are puzzling and are not in accord
with those  reported below.  We estimate,  for example,  that over the four-year  period 1973-76,  the simulated
competitive  price exceeded  the simulated  price with dairy programs in place by  1.8% on average.
4 For a detailed description of national dairy policy,  refer to the  1984  U.S. Department of Agriculture  staff
report.
5 Grade  A milk is produced under farm sanitary conditions that make it eligible for fluid products.  Grade B
milk can be used only for manufacturing purposes. About  80% of U.S. milk is Grade  A.
6 For further theoretical justification of the model analyzed here,  see the report of the AAEA  Task Force  and
the pioneering studies cited therein.
7 If one outlier (for 1966) is omitted, the MAP error for the price of manufacturing milk falls by nearly  1%.
8 Estimating what the price differential between fluid and manufacturing  milk would be under "competitive"
conditions  poses  grave  difficulties.  After  reviewing  the literature,  the  AAEA  Task  Force put the  differential
between  15 and 20¢  per cwt. Others (e.g., Manchester)  believe the differential is much higher, more on the order
of 50¢  as of 1977.  We use the 50¢  differential as an approximate upper bound that may be useful,  along with
the zero differential,  in making interval estimates.
9  On the basis of a two-regime structural dairy model, Liu et al. (p. 371)  estimate that raising the Class I price
differential  actually elevates  the manufacturing  price. They do not explain how this could be.
1 0Estimates like those reported  in tables 3 and 4 also were made  for  1980.  Our estimated  welfare effects in
absolute value for 1980  are a good deal less  than those reported  by LaFrance  and de Gorter  for the same year.
Our estimated long-run gains to fluid milk buyers and manufacturing milk buyers as percentages of  the LaFrance-
de  Gorter estimates  are,  respectively,  75% and  52%.  The corresponding  figure  for loss of producer  surplus is
78%.
I  Bausell, Belsley, and Smith suggest  that the federal government should  not have  used the Milk Diversion
and Dairy Termination  Programs  to reduce  capacity,  but should have slashed  the support price instead.  One
might argue,  however, that having been the prime cause for the creation of excess capacity,  the government was
under  some obligation to ease the burden of production adjustment.
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